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Abstract
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Irrigation management transfer is an important 
strategy among donors and governments to strengthen 
farmer control over water and irrigation infrastructure.  
This study seeks to understand whether irrigation 
management transfer is meeting the promise of its 
commitments.  The authors use data from a survey of 
68 irrigator associations and 1,020 farm households 
in the Philippines to estimate the impact of irrigation 
management transfer on irrigation association 
performance and on rice yields.  They also estimate 
a stochastic frontier production function to assess 
contributions to technical efficiency.  There are three 
main results. First, the presence of irrigation management 
transfer is associated with an increase in maintenance 
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activities undertaken by irrigation associations. Second, 
by increasing local control over water delivery, the 
presence of irrigation management transfer is associated 
with a 2-6 percent increase in farm yields.  Rice 
production in irrigation management transfer areas is 
greater even after controlling for various differences 
among rice farmers in transfer and non-transfer areas. 
Third, irrigation management transfer is, at a minimum, 
poverty-neutral, and may even give the asset-poor a small 
boost in terms of rice yields.  The authors speculate that 
this boost may be a result of increased timeliness of water 
delivery and better resolution of conflicts related to illegal 
use. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last several decades communities have increasingly sought and won control over 
the management of natural resources.  Developing countries have seen a shift from 
traditional state control over resources to increased local authority.  This trend towards 
decentralization in resource management is a result of a growing recognition that the state 
cannot effectively monitor the local uses of natural resources.  Simultaneously, it has also 
become clear that the local communities, under differing circumstances and conditions, 
are able to cooperate to successfully manage resource use (Ostrom 1990, Baland and 
Platteau 1996, Agrawal 2001).    
 
While decentralization in resource management is prevalent in several sectors, it is 
perhaps strongest in irrigation management. This process of transferring irrigation 
management responsibilities from the government to farmer or irrigator organizations, 
also known as irrigation management transfer (IMT), first began and expanded in the 
United States, France, Colombia, and Taiwan during the 1950s through the 1970s.  Many 
developing countries followed this trend in the 1980s and 1990s (Vermillion 1992, Araral 
2005).  Today, participatory irrigation is an important component of irrigation reform 
worldwide.  
 
There are many reasons for the increased interest in participatory irrigation.  First, 
irrigation provision has proven to be a large financial burden on national irrigation 
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agencies and exchequers.  Cash-strapped irrigation departments, unable to sustain 
investments in infrastructure, are looking to transfer operational responsibilities to 
farmers. Further, the possibility of increased floods and droughts from climate change has 
re-focused attention on water-use efficiency and the need for local scrutiny and control.  
There is also the general trend towards all forms of decentralization in government 
functions, which has found support in the irrigation sector.   
 
In practical terms, participatory irrigation has resulted in the growth of a larger number of 
farmer-run irrigation or water user associations.  These associations have taken on 
numerous functions that were previously the responsibility of national irrigation agencies.  
This has meant a reduced role for government agencies in operation and maintenance 
(O&M), fee collection, water management, and conflict resolution.   
 
Though participatory irrigation management is widespread, there is surprisingly little 
evidence about its impacts (Araral 2005).  There are several studies that focus on 
government savings; however, fewer have sought to quantify impacts on farm 
productivity or water conservation (see Araral 2005 and Vermillion 1997).  A recent 
exception is a study by Wang et al. (2006), which examines the role of water user 
associations in influencing water savings in China.  They find that monetary incentives to 
water managers can contribute to water savings; however, these savings do not result in 
any increase in the incidence of poverty. 
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The link between irrigation reform and poverty has come under increasing scrutiny.  
Many critics suggest that irrigation reform has moved away from its original objectives 
of improving the livelihoods of poor farmers because of its focus on reducing the state’s 
financial burdens (Kloezen et al. 1997; Vermillion 1997; Koppen et al. 2002; Shah et al. 
2002). The majority of the world’s poor is rural and dependent on farming in one form or 
the other.  Thus, institutional reform in the irrigation sector ultimately has to contribute to 
the lot of the poor. Thus, far there are few studies that carefully examine this question.  
There is also little empirical literature on whether there are differential effects of 
institutional reforms within farming communities.  
 
This paper is motivated by the need to understand the farm level impacts of irrigation 
management transfer.  We try to address three key questions through the paper:  a) Is 
irrigation management transfer associated with improvements in the irrigation system 
through increased operations and maintenance and better revenue collection? b) Does the 
increased control farmers have as a result of IMT translate to improvements in crop 
yield? c) Do these improvements differ for rich and poor farmers? We address these 
questions through a case study in the Philippines.   
 
We use an econometric approach to answer these questions.  We first examine whether 
the performance of irrigation associations as reflected in operations and maintenance 
activities changes when management transfer occurs.  The hypothesis is that management 
transfer leads to local control and improves system performance.  Second, we look at 
farm yield impacts.  We estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function and examine 
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whether yields are affected by increased local control over water delivery. Third, we 
estimate a stochastic frontier production function to assess the decrease in overall 
production in-efficiency.  We then look at distributional issues related to yield impacts to 
understand whether irrigation reforms have a similar effect on rich and poor farmers. 
 
This paper is based on data from a survey of 1020 households and 68 irrigation 
associations covering the Magat River Integrated Irrigation System, a reservoir irrigation 
system in the Philippines.  The section below first describes the irrigation management 
system in the Philippines.  This is followed by a discussion on methodological issues and 
data.  Results and conclusions follow. 
 
2.  Irrigation Management Transfer in the Philippines 
 
In the Philippines, some 50 percent of the irrigation service area is managed publicly 
under national irrigation systems; another 37% is managed by communal irrigation 
systems and 13% by private irrigation systems.  The national systems are owned and 
operated by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a semi-autonomous 
government corporation that is responsible for irrigation development. (Sabio and 
Mendoza 2002, Bagadion 2002). 
 
The Philippines history of organizing farmers to improve production goes back to the late 
1960s.  However, a more participatory approach to irrigation management was first 
developed in the mid-1970s for communal systems, and then expanded to national 
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systems in the 1980s.  By December 1999, some 2078 IAs operated in nationally owned 
irrigation systems and 3018 IAs managed communal systems.  Overall, these irrigator 
associations cover 82% of the area developed for irrigation (Mejia 2002). 
 
In the 1990s, irrigation management transfer (IMT) emerged as a new type of contract 
between irrigation associations and the National Irrigation Administration.  This meant 
that NIA would progressively become a "whole-sale irrigation water manager" for head-
works and main systems, while empowered irrigators associations took over 
responsibility for smaller systems.  IMT was actually launched under a World Bank 
funded project called the Second Irrigation Operations Support Project (IOSP II) and the 
first IMT contract was signed in 1998 in Magat Integrated Irrigation System.  However, 
the initial IMT conditionality and guidelines under this project were somewhat vague.  
These were made more concrete and comprehensive program under a second World Bank 
loan in 1996.
1  There was simultaneously a strong push towards decentralization effort 
within the Philippines government.  In December 1997, the government enacted the 
Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act, which facilitated further devolution in the 
irrigation sector.   
 
A typical irrigation association has a Board of Directors and Officers.  It oversees a 
variety of irrigation management and infrastructure maintenance related tasks and in 
some cases offers other services as well.  NIA supports the growth and development of 
these IAs, which can enter into different types of contracts with NIA.  An IMT contract, 
                                                 
1 Water Resources Development Project. 
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in particular, transfers operations and maintenance responsibilities of secondary canals or 
laterals to IAs (World Bank 2001).  This transfer in O&M responsibility is accompanied 
by changes in how water-user fees are obtained from farmers and used by associations.  
In most cases, the change marks a move to a simple 50-50 sharing of water user fees 
between IAs and NIA – this money is collected by IAs from members and sent to NIA, 
which then returns part of the fees.   
 
The motivation behind IMT is that it will reduce government responsibilities for 
operation and maintenance and simultaneously increase farmer supervision over water-
use.  This is in line with a broad government strategy to empower communities through 
decentralization, increase accountability and quality of public sector services, and, 
streamline the public sector.  By lowering government expenditures and strengthening 
local governance, IMT is expected to have a long-term impact on the country’s 
agricultural and natural resource sectors.  Figure 1 summarizes some of the mechanisms 
through which IMT can be expected to benefit farm households. 
 
First, IMT is expected to increase the control local farmer associations have on irrigation 
infrastructure and water.  For example in a recent survey of 63 IMT contracts in 19 
systems across the Philippines provides, association leaders were asked what they liked 
most about IMT -- the top two reasons were the sense of ownership and control and 
access to revenues (Hassal and Associates International 2004).  With an IMT contract, 
these associations can make better decisions regarding water delivery and timeliness and 
can organize themselves to resolve conflicts and maintain infrastructure.  Without local 
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control, associations have to wait for the national agency to come in and undertake 
repairs – with IMT they perform repairs as and when needed.    
 
In terms of revenue generation, an IMT contract makes IAs responsible for collecting 
user fees from members.  The fees are remitted to the National Irrigation Administration, 
which then sends back a portion.  While this process of money transfer is tedious and has 
resulted in many complaints about NIA, it still increases access to resources by IAs.  
These resources are critical to the functioning of IAs and enable them to harness 
members to undertake routine maintenance of canals.   
 
Irrigation management transfer to the extent that it improves the quantity and timeliness 
of water delivery and reduces uncertainty also affects farm yields.  First, there is the 
direct effect of having water when the farmer needs it.  Crops require water at different 
stages and yields are likely to improve if there is a good match between water delivery 
and critical growth stages. Second, if the farmer is more certain about water delivery, 
then this may affect his or her decisions related to other input use.  Thus, it is likely to 
increase the overall efficiency of farm production.  This is an issue that we examine in 
detail in this paper.  
 
Also of interest to us in this paper is the distributional effect of institutional change.  
Recent literature on decentralization in natural resource management raises the possibility 
of elite capture, with the rich gaining more than the poor (Adhikari 2003; Klooster 2000a; 
Klooster 2000b).   In an interesting study, Koppen et al. (2002), compare the impacts of 
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irrigation management transfer on poor and non-poor farmers in India and note that 
interests of the poor do not always overlap with the overall general goals of irrigation 
schemes.  They find that small farmers, who often participate in repair and rehabilitation 
work, can be unaware of the existence of the water user association, while large farmers 
involve themselves in committee work and makes decisions. The evidence from Andhra 
Pradesh and Gujarat, India, points to the strong domination of local elite. 
 
IMT increases local control over water-distribution and can result in localized re-
allocation of water – the effect of this on poorer farmers is not clear and will depend on 
the type of re-allocation done.  However, improved matching of farmer needs with water 
availability could mean that there is more water available in upstream as well as 
downstream areas. To the extent that the poorer households are located in downstream 
areas, any improvements in water availability will give them an additional boost. 
 
While the theory on how IMT is supposed to work is reasonably clear and there is some 
evidence that IMT is beneficial, there are questions globally about whether governments 
have been too fast in passing on irrigation management responsibilities to local 
associations (Fujuiie et al. 2005).  It is important to carefully examine if ground reality 
matches the conceptual design of irrigation reforms in the Philippines.  Clearly, there are 
many things that are changed locally when institutional reforms are implemented.  There 
are several levels at which decisions need be made – NIA level, IA level as well as by the 
farmer and at each stage there may be incentives that work to promote or undermine the 
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change.  Thus, whether IMT is good for irrigation in the Philippines is an empirical 
question and we examine various aspects of this question in the rest of the paper. 
 
IMT in the Philippines is still evolving.  Thus, our assessment of IMT is at a point when 
the program cannot be considered a fully mature program.  However, an intervention or 
reform is never implemented in one-go and there are generally changes over time that are 
difficult to predict. Thus, we feel that it is reasonable to examine the IMT program in the 
Philippines in its middle years. 
 
3.  Study Area and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our study was undertaken in the Magat River Integrated Irrigation System (MRIIS) in 
Region-2, Luzon, of the Philippines.  The system is located in the basin of the Magat 
River, which runs into the Cagayan Valley.  It covers 85,294 hectares of service area and 
encompasses three provinces: Isabella, Quirino and Ifugao.
2  The dams in this system 
provide year-round irrigation and rice is the major crop grown.  Our goal was examine 
one particular fairly simple reservoir-based irrigation system to understand whether IMT 
was indeed beneficial to farmers. 
 
Irrigation associations started in MRIIS more than two decades ago.  Some of the earliest 
IAs were registered in 1980 and the number of IAs rapidly expanded during the eighties. 
                                                 
2 It has four administrative irrigation districts: District III (20,366 hectares) is on the left bank of the river 
and Districts I (21,797 hectares), II (23,241 hectares) and IV (19,890 hectares) on the right bank. 
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However, IAs with IMT contracts is a relatively new phenomenon.  As of 2003 some 
60% of the service area was under IMT contracts.  For our study, we collected primary 
data from 68 irrigation associations or approximately 20% of the 349 IAs in MRIIS.  The 
survey included questions on irrigation infrastructure, service fees, IA or CIA (council of 
IAs) governance, and system O&M.   
 
We selected a random sample of 43 IAs under IMT contract and 25 IAs that were not 
under IMT for the survey.  Our goal was to carefully examine the IAs with IMT contracts 
and compare their performance with similar IAs that had yet to sign these contracts. Our 
sample data shows that 86% of the selected IMT IAs had signed their IMT contract with 
NIA prior to or during 2001.  By the end of 2006, some 68% of the IAs in MRIIS had 
signed an IMT contract with NIA.  
 
Our study also involved a household survey of 1,020 farm households or approximately 
9% of the total IA membership in MRIIS.  The households selected for this study were 
chosen from a master list of IA farmer members from the District Offices.  A random 
sample of 15 farmers was identified from each IA. The survey of IA and farm households 
was undertaken during May to August of 2003.  The survey collected data on various 
farm level inputs and outputs as well as information on the effects of IMT.  Secondary 
data was obtained on variables such as historical user fee collection from the irrigation 
district offices.   
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A simple comparison of IAs with IMT and IAs without IMT along different indicators is 
presented in Table 1.  It shows that both IMT and non-IMT IAs are of approximately the 
same size in terms of hectares managed.  The IMT IAs tend to service a somewhat larger 
number of farmers and seem to have slightly greater percentage of upstream and 
midstream farmers.  In terms of irrigation infrastructure, the IMT IAs have a slightly 
larger number of gates, more lined canals and modified infrastructure.  These differences 
are not huge and are logical because IAs tend to get some infrastructure assistance prior 
to obtaining IMT contracts. 
 
Interestingly there are few obvious differences among IMT and non-IMT IAs in terms of 
a variety of governance indicators on which we collected data.  For instance, there is little 
difference in the fee collection rate from farmer members or number of female Board 
members.  However, we do find that IMT IAs are better at managing and resolving 
conflicts from the household data. Households in IMT and non-IMT areas were asked 
various questions about irrigation water distribution, conflicts and conflict resolution and 
involvement in maintenance activities.   Significantly more households in IMT IAs said 
that the IAs helped with conflict resolution (see Table 2).   
 
An important objective of transferring management responsibility to IAs is to enable 
them to take over routine maintenance of irrigation infrastructure.  A simple comparison 
of means shows that this is true of some indicators.  A larger percentage of IMT IAs are 
likely to prepare maintenance plans each year and participate in canal cleaning.  There 
are other indicators of maintenance on which IMT and non-IMT IAs do equally well.  A 
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significantly larger percentage of households in IMT areas relative to non-IMT areas said 
that the water distribution schedule was followed and they participated in routine 
maintenance activities (Table 2).   
 
Simple mean differences between farm households are reported in Table 2, which shows 
that about 84% of the sample of farmers has at least a high school degree and some 40% 
of the households are college educated.  There is little difference in education, household 
assets or livestock between farmers in IMT and non-IMT areas.  Farmers in both areas on 
average farm approximately 2.4 hectares on land in each season.  Thus, the average farm 
is still rather small. 
 
While household characteristics and assets are more or less equal among farmers in IMT 
and non-IMT areas, there are some interesting differences in farm output.  Farmers in 
IMT areas have on average a 7% higher yield.  In the next few sections we follow up on 
this issue and ask if the higher yield is linked to the presence of IMT. 
 
The survey also asked questions about perceptions of change over the last five years.  As 
Table 2 shows, a larger percentage of farmers in IMT areas said that they had seen 
improvements in three aspects: a) services provided by IAs or NIA; b) participation of 
farmers in O&M activities; and c) timeliness of water delivery.  In general, the first level 
analyses of mean differences among households in IMT and non-IMT IAs suggests that 
households in IMT areas do better in terms of a variety of irrigation related issues. 
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4.  Methods 
 
We try to gauge whether or not IMT is successful is by examining IA performance and 
by investigating farmer level benefits.  There are many methodological challenges to 
assessing performance and ascribing improvements to IMT, which we discuss below.   
 
4.1. IMT impacts on irrigation association performance 
 
The IMT contract hands over responsibility over canal O&M to IAs.  It also specifies that 
the IAS have to collect membership dues.   But does this actually happen?  And does it 
translate to a greater effort at canal re-shaping or improved efficiency in fee collection?  
More importantly are any observed differences due to IMT or other pre-existing factors?  
To answer such questions, we consider IAs with IMT contracts and very similar IAs that 
have yet to sign their contracts and examine their performance.   
 
In order to attribute differences in IA performances to an IMT contract, we have to 
account for pre-existing differences.  We are interested in two outcomes that could be 
improved as a result of IMT: canal maintenance and fee collection.  However, a simple 
comparison of mean differences in these outcomes does not tell us whether this reflects 
IMT influence.  In particular, some of the pre-existing differences between IAs may have 
been instrumental to specific IAs being selected for IMT.  For example, IAs with more 
irrigation infrastructure are more likely to join IMT.  Similarly, IAs with leaders with 
better leadership skills may be more likely to join in IMT.  In both these cases the factors 
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influencing the participation in IMT are also factors that influence the performance of the 
IAs. 
 
While various irrigation infrastructures are observable in our data, the leadership skills of 
IAs leaders are not.  These are examples of selection bias based on observable and 
unobservable data.  Assuming unobservable factors are time invariant, correction for both 
observable and unobservable selection bias in the evaluation of impacts requires before 
and after intervention data.  Without base-line ‘before IMT’ data, we use cross-sectional 
data and compute the average treatment on treated (ATT) by comparing IMT IAs with 
non-IMT IAs.  ATT measures the average effect of IMT on the performance 
(maintenance of canals and fee collection) of those IAs with IMT contrasted with a 
hypothetical scenario where these IAs do not have IMT.
3   
 
We estimate the impact of IMT on maintenance and fee collection by using both non-
parametric and parametric methods.  The non-parametric estimations used to evaluate the 
performance of irrigation management transfer are based on propensity score matching 
methods.  A propensity score is an index that reflects the probability of an IA having an 
IMT contract.  It is used to match non-IMT IAs (the comparator group) with IMT IAs 
(the treatment group) on the basis of a set of observed characteristics. Once the two sets 
are matched, then outcome indicators related to the two groups can be compared.  This 
method is appealing where only cross-sectional data are available to examine program 
                                                 
3 In impact evaluation jargon, ‘treatment’ refers to the participation of IAs in IMT and the ‘treated’ IAs are 
the IMT-IAs.   
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impacts and is regarded as one of the best alternatives when random experiment design is 
not possible (Rubin 1973).  
 
To calculate the propensity score, we model the probability of an IA getting an IMT 
contract as a function of aggregated household and community characteristics. 
 
 ) 1 ( ) 1 Pr( 2 1 0 e IA F IMT + + + Φ = = α α α   (1) 
 
where IMT is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an IA is an IMT-IA and 0 
otherwise. The probability of an IA becoming an IMT IA depends on factors that 
influence the ability of IAs to obtain an IMT contract, local conditions, and the process 
by which IMT reforms were implemented in the Philippines.  Thus, our choice of the 
variables included in (1) reflects our understanding of the factors that affect collective 
action (Agrawal 2001) and our knowledge of conditions that influenced IMT evolution in 
Magat.  Only a handful of studies have attempted to econometrically assess the role of 
different factors in influencing the behavior of irrigation associations (Bardhan 2000, 
Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002).  Of particular interest is a recent study of irrigator 
associations in the Philippines by Fujiie et al. (2005), which finds find that collective 
action in irrigation is influenced by water availability and variability, association size, 
population density, share of non-farm farmers and the history of irrigated farming.  There 
is no underlying theory that tells us the functional form that (1) takes.   
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In (1), F is a vector of farmer member characteristics and includes aggregate level of 
education of the head of households, which reflects leadership; percent of catholic 
households in the IA, an indicator of social norms; the average number of years a 
household in the IA has been a member of other user groups, reflecting a history of 
collective action; and average land size in the IA and the number of farmers that are IA 
members, which are indicators of association size..   
 
IA1 is a vector of irrigation system characteristics such as length of canals, number of 
head gates, number of duckbills, and other community characteristics such as whether the 
IA has a post office, and the ratio of IMT-IAs in the municipality.  The last variable 
captures the peer effect of IMT on IA -- an IA in a municipality with relatively more 
IMT-IAs is likely to be an IMT-IA.  In Magat, IMT was implemented under two World 
Bank funded projects and most IAs that got an IMT contract needed to have some 
infrastructural improvements made.  Thus, controlling for infrastructural differences is 
very important.  All IAs with investments in infrastructure did not, however, get IMT 
contracts.  Our understanding is that only in District 2 all IAs with improved 
infrastructure received IMT contracts.  Staff redundancy concerns within the National 
Irrigation Administration resulted in some IAs with infrastructural improvements in the 
other three districts getting the contracts and others not. We try to capture this difference 
through an indicator variable for District 2.  It takes the value 1 when an IA belongs to 
that irrigation district and zero otherwise.
4
 
                                                 
4 We tested for more elaborate fixed effect differences between the irrigation districts and rejected the 
hypotheses.  We report only fixed effect of the District 2 in the results section. 
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The probability function (1) allows us to estimate a propensity score for each IA.  We 
then use four different methods to match the IMT IAs with non-IMT IAs:  kernel density 
weighted, radius, nearest neighbor, and stratification method.   Each method uses a 
slightly different approach to match the propensity scores of the two sets of IAs – details 
of these methods can be found in Abadie et al. (2003) and Imbens (2004).   
 
Once we have matched IMT IAs with non-IMT IAs, we measure the impact of IMT on 
the irrigation system by examining two outcome indicators: maintenance and irrigation 
service fees collection.  Thus, we arrive at four alternate measures of ATT, each of which 
estimate the impact of IMT on the IAs as the average difference in maintenance and 
service fee collection between the matched IMT IA and the non-IMT IAs. 
 
We actually use two measures of maintenance indicators:  (i) whether the IAs prepare a 
maintenance plan every year, (ii) whether canals in the IAs are reshaped/maintained more 
than twice a year or when needed.  The effectiveness of irrigation service fee collection is 
measured by (iii) collection efficiency in the dry season of 2003 for each IA. Collection 
efficiency is defined as the ratio of actual collection to the target set by NIA. 
 
An alternate parametric way of estimating the impact of IMT on the irrigation system is 
to use instrument variable method.  For this we model the outcome indicators as a 
function of IA characteristics described above except the IMT peer effect indicator and 
include predicted IMT as one of the factors affecting the outcome indicators.  The 
instrument variable, predicted IMT, is modeled as (1) above.  This allows us to partly 
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control for the fact that IAs choose to undertake IMT contracts and the underlying un-
observed characteristics that enable IAs to make this choice may also affect the outcome 
variables. 
 
Both propensity score matching and instrument variable approaches to impact evaluation 
have known limitations. The non-parametric, propensity score based estimates of ATT 
take into account the selection bias from the observable factors such as infrastructure. 
However, the various methods of matching based on propensity score do not always 
provide similar results.  The parametric estimates of ATT from the instrument variable 
approach take into account self selection biases from observable and unobservable 
factors.  However, the estimates of ATT depend on the functional form of the model 
(Ravallion 2001).  There is no clear theory that can be applied to identify the functional 
form used to estimate the determinants of association level outcomes.  Thus, various non-
parametric and parametric measures of ATT have different strengths and weaknesses.  
We report estimates based on all the methods to test the robustness of our results. 
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4.2. Effect of IMT on farm yield 
 
A second important objective of our study is to assess whether IMT has an effect on 
farm-level outcomes.  Our hypothesis is that farm yield improvements are likely to occur 
in IMT areas because of increased timeliness in water delivery, better distribution of 
water delivery and decreased water losses due to improved maintenance.   
 
A key analytical question is how to model the impact of IMT on yield.  Traditional 
economic analyses allows for different factors, including technical change, to shift the 
production function.  Thus, one option is to estimate a production function and then allow 
IMT and household demographic factors to shift production. This strategy assumes that 
households are fully efficient and produce the maximum possible yield given various 
inputs.  There are many examples of this form of modeling farm household behavior -- 
one sees this done, for example, in understanding the effect of extension services 
(Birkhaeuser et al. 1991; Bindlish and Evenson 1997). 
 
However, if we drop the assumption of perfect efficiency in production, then the 
analytical model changes.  Total growth in production can then be viewed to be a result 
of efficiency improvements and not just increases in input use or technological 
improvements (Fan 1991).  Efficiency gains in production have two aspects: allocative 
and technical in efficiency.  Farmers are considered technically inefficient when they 
produce less than the maximum output possible given a certain input mix.  The idea here 
is there are differences in farm yields across farmers because of differences in 
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knowledge, institutions and motivations (Fan 1991). Since IMT changes the institutional 
structure of water management, we can expect it to improve technical efficiency.  We 
assume allocative efficiency since our study area is in one of the most developed rice 
cultivating regions in the Philippines.  
 
A common empirical problem in estimating production functions is that labor and capital 
can be endogenous and may vary with un-observed variables that affect yield.  This 
problem of endogeniety has recently led to a focus on cost and profit functions rather 
than production functions.  However, in our case, there was limited variation in farm 
input and output prices making it impossible to use the dual approach.  This is a frequent 
problem with cross-sectional data and suggests that some care needs to be taken in 
interpreting results (Barrett et al. 2004). 
 
In this study, we first assume technical efficiency and estimate the impact of IMT on 
yield. We then test whether IMT contributes to increased technical efficiency of rice 
production by using the stochastic frontier methodology pioneered by Battese and Coelli 
(1995).   
 
To estimate the effect of IMT on production, we first start with a simple yield function: 
 
         (2) 
ε e s m l f y ) ; , ( =
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where y is yield per hectare, l is the labor used per hectare, m is materials used per 
hectare, s a vector of factors including IMT that affect yield, and ε an error term.
5   
 
Demographic heterogeneity of the households and agricultural and irrigation 
infrastructure may shift the yield function in (2).   More importantly, if the IMT results in 
a more effective water delivery, then that too may shift the yield function.  If we assume 
a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale, the yield function 
together with demographic and IA characteristics may be specified as: 
 
  ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = IMT IA HH m l y 6 5 4 3 2 0 2 log log log   (3) 
 
where y, l, and m are as defined above. HH is a vector of household characteristics such 
as age of the head, total number of household members, an indicator variable that takes 
the value 1 if the highest level of education in the household is high school or better and 0 
otherwise, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the household is not catholic and 
0 otherwise, the number of days water takes to reach the household farm, and an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1 if the household landholding has a drainage canal and 0 
                                                 
5 One of the reasons we estimate a yield function is because of the way labor is used in rice production in 
the region.  It is the local custom to contract out various labor intensive activities either on the basis of area 
cultivated or as a share of output harvested.  For example, cost of weeding contract may be per hectare 
rather than wage hours.  Similarly costs of harvesting activities were measured as percent of harvested 
output.  Thus, the study does not have an independent measure of labor input and cannot estimate a 
standard production function. 
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otherwise.  IA2 is a vector of IA characteristics such as, an indicator variable that takes 
the value 1 if the IA has an agricultural extension office and 0 otherwise, the number of 
head gates, the number of modified pipes, and the number of duckbills.  IMT takes the 
value 1 if the IA has an IMT contract or 0 otherwise. 
 
Another methodological concern relates to self-selection.  As discussed in the previous 
section, the selection of IMT-areas may have been based on the community 
characteristics.  Some of the observed characteristics of the IMT and non-IMT areas are 
similar (Tables 1 and 2).  However, there may be other unobserved characteristics of 
these areas, that may have influenced the selection of an area for IMT and these same 
unobserved characteristics may also influence the yield of the farmers in the IMT areas.  
To test this hypothesis, we model the probability of an area being selected for IMT as a 
function of community characteristics as in (1) above and then jointly estimate (1) and 
(3). 
 
Unobservable factors affecting both selection and outcome indicators are a source of 
concern in any impact evaluation analysis.  In this case, IMT participation and 
agricultural productivity may be influenced by some factor for which there are no data.  
Thus, such factors cannot be explicitly modeled into the analysis.  Let us assume there is 
such an unobservable factor, say leadership (within NIA or the community), that makes 
an IA more productive as well as more likely to participate in the IMT.  In the presence 
of this leadership the influence of IMT may appear to be greater on the agricultural yield.  
Since leadership is unobservable, its effect on (1) will be in the residual error term e. 
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Similarly the influence of x on (3) will be in the error term ε.  To be precise, households 
in IAs with better leadership will have higher e and higher ε. That is, if there is any 
selection bias based on unobservable factors the e and ε will be correlated.  
 
To test the hypothesis that unobservable factors affect both (1) and (3) we jointly estimate 
the two equations using maximum likelihood estimators and test if the correlation 
coefficient ρ between the e and ε. equals zero. 
 
4.3. Stochastic Frontier Analyses 
 
Greater control over water a delivery allows the farmer to make better decisions related to 
farm production.  Thus, IMT may contribute to production efficiency.  We can test this 
hypothesis through stochastic frontier analysis.  The assumption here is that stochastic 
inefficiency prevents households from reaching maximum potential yield and 
demographic and IA heterogeneities affect farm yield via this inefficiency.  A detailed 
exposition of the frontier analysis is found in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).  To examine 
stochastic in-efficiency, the production function is re-written as follows: 
 
 
) , 0 ( ~
) , 0 ( ~












  (4) 
 
The error term in the production function is assumed to be composed of two components, 
one component having a symmetric normal distribution v and the other component 
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having a strictly non-negative half-normal distribution u. The error term u represents 
technical inefficiency and is assumed to be heteroskedastic.   
 
To estimate stochastic in-efficiency, the variance of u for the household is modeled as a 
function of household demographic and IA characteristics, s.  
 
    (5)  η σ + = ) ( log
2 s g u
 
The variables that affect technical in-efficiency in (5) include a vector of household 
characteristics such as age of the head, total number of household members, an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1 if the highest level of education in the household is high 
school or better and 0 otherwise, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the 
household is not catholic and 0 otherwise, the number of days water takes to reach the 
household farm, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the household landholding 
has a drainage canal and 0 otherwise.  Also included are a vector of IA characteristics 
such as, an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the IA has an agricultural extension 
office and 0 otherwise, the number of head gates, the number of modified pipes, and the 
number of duckbills.  IMT is hypothesized to reduce technical efficiency.  Hence, the 
coefficient associated with IMT in (5) is expected to be negative.   
 
We jointly estimate (4) and (5) using maximum likelihood estimators.  To determine 
whether the frontier production model is more appropriate than the OLS estimation we 
test the null hypothesis that σ 
2
u = 0 against the alternate hypothesis σ 
2
u > 0.   
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The issue of primary interest to us is whether IMT has an impact on yield. To determine 
the IMT impact on yield, we calculate the average treatment on the treated (ATT).  That 
is, the average increase in yield for all the households in IMT-IAs that may be attributed 
to the IMT contract is given by:  
  [] ∑ = − = =
IMT N
i
i i i i
IMT
IMT x y IMT x y
N
ATT ) 0 | ( ) 1 | (
1 ) )   (6) 
where NIMT is the number of households in the sample from the IMT-IAs and ŷi is the 
predicted yield for the ith household. IMT=1 refers to the assumption that the IA for the 
ith household is an IMT IA and IMT=0 refers to the assumption that the IA for the ith 
household is a non-IMT IA. 
 
4.4. Rich versus Poor Households 
 
An important motivation for undertaking this study was to assess whether increasing 
local control over water supply and irrigation facilities IMT had a differential impact on 
rich versus poor farmers.  IMT is rarely set up to help the most vulnerable farmers.  
Rather, while local responsibility adds to farmers’ burden by making them undertaken 
maintenance activities, it does not always help them with commensurate increases in 
income.  Thus, we were interested in knowing whether local control translates to yield 
differences among the better off farmers as well as the less better off.  Theoretically, if 
there is elite capture by IA executives, then it is possible that the better-off gain more 
from IMT rather than the small farmers.  
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To assess whether rich households benefit more as compared with the poor households, 
we group the households by the value of household assets.  Asset poor households were 
defined as the bottom two quintile households based on the value of household assets.  
Separate estimations of the standard yield function as well as the frontier function were 
computed for asset poor and asset rich groups of households.  We test the hypothesis that 
the respective coefficients for IMT for the two groups are significantly different. 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1.  IMT and IA performance 
 
The results of propensity score and instrument variable based methods to understand the 
impact of IMT on a) development of maintenance plans; b) canal maintenance; and c) 
irrigation service fee collection are presented in Table 3.  We note that there are five 
different methods in which the impact of IMT on these outcome measures is assessed. 
 
Both the propensity score and instrumental variable approach indicate that IMT is a 
significant motive for canal maintenance.  IMT appears to be the reason for undertaking 
canal maintenance work in 60 to 80 percent of the IAs that undertake maintenance 
activities more than twice a season or when needed.   
 
In terms of development maintenance plans, the instrument variable estimator indicates 
that an IA’s maintenance plan is associated with the presence of IMT 47 percent of the 
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time.  However, this strong conclusion is not supported by the four propensity score 
approaches.  The kernel density and nearest neighbor based propensity score matching 
indicate between 17 to 19 percent of the collection efficiency gains may be associated 
with the presence of IMT.   
 
All the five different statistical methods suggest that the difference in canal maintenance 
efforts between IMT IAs and non-IMT IAs is statistically significant and positive.  Thus, 
a significantly higher maintenance effort is associated with IMT and not other underlying 
factors.   These results reinforce some anecdotal evidence that IMT IAs are undertaking 
more maintenance. On the other hand only two of the statistical methods indicate that 
higher collection efficiency of irrigation service fees in IMT IAs can be attributed to 
IMT.  Thus, we have less confidence in the collection efficiency indicator of IMT 
performance.   
 
5.2. Farm Yields 
 
Columns 1 of Table 4 show the OLS estimates of the yield function without the farmer 
and IA “shift” variables. The material and labor input coefficients are statistically 
significant.  The sum of the two coefficients is less than one as expected.   
 
Column 2 of Table 4 adds the heterogeneity shift variables to the estimation.  The input 
coefficients are similar to those in Column 1.  The shift variables where significant have 
the expected signs.  In particular the IMT indicator variable has a positive and significant 
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coefficient. This indicates IMT is associated with significantly higher rice yield 
productivity.  By this measure, about 6 percent of productivity gain is associated with the 
presence of IMT. 
 
Column 3 of Table 4 shows the results of the instrument variable (IV) estimation of the 
yield function.  The IMT indicator is instrumented by (1) into (3).  The result is presented 
in the column 3 of Table 4 and the results of (1) are in Table 5.  The material and labor 
input coefficients of the instrument variable estimation for the yield function is close to 
the OLS estimations in column 1 and 2.  As in the OLS estimation in column 3, the 
coefficient of IMT is statistically significant in the IV estimation.   
 
We note that the correlation coefficient ρ between the error terms of (1) and (3) in Table 
5 is not statistically significant.  Thus, the hypothesis that unobserved community 
characteristics systematically affected the IMT selection process as well as the rice 
productivity is rejected.  In other words we find no evidence of selection bias for IMT 
from unobserved community characteristics after controlling for community and IA 
characteristics in Table 5.  Thus, we take IMT selection to be exogenous to the household 
rice productivity estimation.    
 
5.3. Stochastic Frontier Results  
 
The stochastic frontier yield estimations without the heteroskedasticity of the technical 
efficiency term are presented in column 1 of Table 6.  The input coefficients are 
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statistically significant and similar in size and sign as compared with the OLS estimations 
in Column 1 of Table 4.   In Table 6, null hypothesis that σ 
2
u = 0 is rejected at better than 
1 percent level of significance.  This implies that the difference between the observed rice 
productivity and the frontier rice productivity is not due to statistical variability alone but 
also due to technical inefficiency of the households. 
 
Column 2 adds the heteroskedasticity component to the error term associated with the 
technical inefficiency error term u in the equation (4).  The second part of Column 2 
shows the estimates of heteroskedastic estimation of (5).  The coefficient for IMT in (5) 
is negative and significant at better than 1 percent level.  This implies IMT reduces the 
variability in the technical inefficiency.  That is, households in IMT areas would have 
lower variability in technical inefficiency. Thus, the IMT coefficient in column 2 of 
Table 6 is not a measure of ATT – it is not directly comparable to the coefficient of IMT 
in column 2 of Table 4, which is a measure of the impact of IMT on yield.  In this case, 
ATT is calculated from this coefficient using predicted yield, based on (6). 
 
The ATT impact of IMT on rice yield is presented at the bottom row of Table 6.  The 
average increase in yield associated with the presence of IMT for the households in IMT-
IAs is 2.2 percent.  As expected the estimates of increase in yields using stochastic 
frontier methods are lower than the increase in yield estimated by the OLS results. 
 
5.4. Rich and Poor 
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Table 7 shows the OLS estimators of the yield functions for the rich and poor households. 
IMT appears to have an impact on rice yield for both the rich households, Column (1), 
and for poor households, Column (2).  A 9 percent boost in rice yield for poor households 
is associated with the presence of IMT whereas the increase in rice yield for rich 
households is 4 percent.  The 5 percent difference in the gain in rice yield for the poor as 
compared with the rich is statistically significant at 5 percent level.  Thus, we find no 
evidence of elite capture in IMT IAs.  The poor households in IMT IAs tend to gain more 
from IMT as compared with the rich households there. 
 
Table 8 shows the stochastic frontier estimators of the yield functions for the rich and 
poor households.  IMT is a significant negative factor determining the heteroskedasticity 
of the technical inefficiency in the estimations for both the rich and poor households. The 
average yield increase attributable to IMT for rich households range between 1.7 percent 
to 2.1 percent and that for the poor households ranges from 3.4 percent to 5.1 percent.  As 
expected the stochastic frontier estimates are lower than the OLS estimates.  The gain in 
yield attributable to IMT for the poor households is double or more as compared with the 
gain for the rich households.  The relative gain in yield for the poor as compared with the 
rich are of similar magnitude (double or more) irrespective of the type of estimator (OLS 
or stochastic frontier). 
 
In order to understand why the poor appear to gain from IMT, we examine some 
additional questions asked the survey.  Table 9 provides information on the how the poor 
view irrigation water delivery and offers some insights into why the poor may be slightly 
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better off under IMT.  A larger percentage of the poor (32%) in IMT IAs are downstream 
farmers relative to the poor in non-IMT IAs (24%).  Further, significantly more of the 
poor farmers in IMT IAs (relative to poor in non-IMT IAs) indicate that the IAs help 
resolve illegal use of water.  Similarly, significantly more of the IMT IA poor indicate 
that the water distribution schedule is followed.
6  Thus, one explanation for the boost 
IMT appears to give the poor lies in the fact that IMT helps increase timeliness of water 
delivery in general, and, more specifically, downstream availability of water.  A recent 
review of IMT worldwide suggests that one of the ways management transfer can help 
poor farmers is by increasing the flow of water from upstream to downstream areas 
(Araral 2005).  Our results appear to back this conclusion.   
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
Irrigation management transfer is an important strategy among donors and governments 
to strengthen farmer control over water.  IMT is also a means to reduce the financial 
burdens of fiscally strapped national irrigation associations.  In this study, we seek to 
understand if IMT is meeting the promise of its commitments.  Our objective is to 
understand whether IMT contributes to improvements in both irrigation system indicators 
and in some household indicators. 
 
                                                 
6T-tests show these differences between asset poor farmers in IMT IAs and non-IMT IAs are statistically 
significant. 
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We draw several important conclusions from this analysis.  First, the presence of IMT is 
associated with an increase in maintenance activities undertaken by irrigation 
associations.  While Irrigation Associations with and without IMT contracts both 
undertake canal maintenance, the frequency of maintenance in IMT IAs is higher. 
 
IMT areas also have higher rice yields to the extent of 2 to 6% relative to non-IMT areas. 
Rice production in IMT IAs is higher even after we control for various differences among 
rice farmers in IMT and non-IMT IAs.  Our analysis shows that IMT is associated with a 
reduction in technical inefficiencies in production. Thus, increasing local control over 
water delivery does appear to help with farm productivity. 
 
IMT is, at a minimum, poverty-neutral, and may even give the asset-poor a boost in terms 
of rice yields.  We speculate that this boost may be related to increased timeliness of 
water availability and improved conflict resolution related to illegal use and maintenance. 
 
Quantitative impact analyses of interventions such as irrigation management transfer are 
best done with pre-intervention and post-intervention data.  In this study, we do not have 
base-line information on irrigation and farm yields prior to IMT -- instead we compare 
farmers affected by the intervention and those who are not.   A criticism of this type of 
study often is that the ‘impact’ we show could be a result of un-observable variables that 
we as researchers are unable to capture in our analyses.  Thus, these un-observables may 
allow some farmers or farmer groups to become early adopters of IMT and the IMT 
‘effect’ that we find is simply the effect of these other variables rather than the impact of 
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IMT itself.  Because we do not have data from ‘before and after’ IMT adoption, we 
cannot exclude this possibility.  However, as our data show, the control and treatment 
groups that we compare are very homogenous.  This is the rice bowl of the country and 
farming related information is easily available to most farmers.  We have also controlled 
for observables such as infrastructure improvements that an important aspect of 
government’s strategy for allowing IMT contracts.  Thus, we do have a degree of 
confidence that there are improvements in outcomes that are associated with the presence 
of IMT. 
 
Another limitation of our study is that it is based on farmer and irrigation association 
member responses rather than any physical measures of irrigation indicators.  We do not 
actually measure or observe differences in maintenance activities or the quality of the 
infrastructure as a result of these activities. However, there are other types of studies that 
are better able to do this -- for example by bringing in engineering skills to the 
evaluation.  Combining quantitative social science research such as this with careful 
qualitative and water research expertise is a good way forward and we understand that 
some of this is happening in the Philippines. 
 
Irrigation Management Transfer in the Philippines is still evolving.  As with any set of 
reforms, there is a huge gap between the initial vision and the implementation of this 
vision. In the case of IMT, our discussions with colleagues who are deeply involved with 
IMT suggest that this gap remains even in 2007, but many implementation problems are 
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being resolved.  Thus, it is possible that our study presents initial insights into the 
potential benefits of a fully evolved IMT program.  
  36 
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Figure 1:  The linkages between IMT, Irrigation Association Activities and Farm Productivity 
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Table 1:  Differences between Irrigation Associations in IMT and non-IMT Areas 








   IA Location and Size          
1  Distance from head gate (KM)  5.5  5.9  4.8  1.1    
2  % IA Located Upstream  25.0%  32.6% 12.0% 20.6% ** 
3  % IA Located Midstream  30.9%  30.2% 32.0% -1.8%    
4  % IA Located Downstream  44.1%  37.2% 56.0% -18.8%     
6  Total area under IA  218  218  219  -1    
7  Farmers IA members  151  165  128  37  ** 
   IA Infrastructure          
12  Length of lined canal / lateral  0.09  0.14  0.01  0.13  * 
15  Number  of  turnouts  8.1  8.6 7.3 1.4 * 
16  Number of modified pipes  1.5  2.0  0.5  1.5  ** 
   IA Governance          
18  Percent of members paying ISF  65.6%  66.7%  63.5%  3.3%    
21  Number of board members  10.6  11.5  9.2  2.3  *** 
22  Number of female board members  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.0    
24  % IA involved by NIA in system operational plans  43.0%  42.0%  44.0%  -2.0%    
26  % IA operating gates   47.0%  72.0%  4.0%  68.0%  ***  
   IA Maintenance          
27  % IA solely responsible for canal maintenance  49.0%  72.0%  8.0%  64.0%   *** 
28  % IA where NIA and IA are jointly responsible for canal maintenance  16.0%  23.0% 4.0%  19.0%   ** 
29  % IA Prepare maintenance plan every  year  45.6%  62.8% 16.0% 46.8% *** 
30  % IA Canal cleaning more than twice a season or when needed  47.1%  62.8%  20.0%  42.8%  *** 
31  % IA where paid participation is most common  23.5%  32.6%  8.0%  24.6%  *** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Significance levels based on t-tests.
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Table 2:  Differences between Households in IMT IAs and non-IMT IAs 
Combined NON-IMT 
Differen
ce    
     Mean 
IMT 
Mean  Mean  in Mean    
   Household Characteristics (% of households)             
1  Walling materials of house made of concrete blocks  85.00%  85.60%  84.00%  1.60%    
2  Max HH education of HS graduate  19.90%  20.30%  19.20%  1.10%    
3  Max HH Education of College graduate  38.90%  38.60%  39.50%  -0.90%    
4  Average age of household (years)  34  34  34  0    
   Agricultural Output and Input        
5  Output / Ha (Peso)  41823  42512  40638  1875  *** 
6  Output (Kg) / Ha  5230  5366  4996  369  *** 
7  Material costs (peso) / Ha  9017  9764  7732  2032    
8  Labor costs (peso) / Ha  11859  11984  11644  340    
9  Area harvested - Palay dry season (Ha)  2.4  2.4  2.3  0    
10  Area harvested - Palay wet season (Ha)  2.4  2.4  2.3  0    
   Livestock, Assets and Protein Food Consumption             
11  Value of Livestock (Peso)  27383  26343  29172  -2829    
12  Value of Assets (Peso)  75778  80381  67862  12519  * 
13  Protein Food Cons. Expd (Peso)  830  795  890  -95    
   Irrigation (% yes)                
14  Water distribution schedule followed  71.60%  74.90%  65.90%  9.00%  *** 
15  Illegal checking sometimes  31.70%  30.40%  33.90%  -3.50%    
16  Never any unscheduled gate opening/closing  56.10%  57.70%  53.30%  4.30%  * 
17  IA helps resolve illegal checking  85.00%  87.70%  80.50%  7.20%  *** 
18  IA helps resolve illegal pumping  84.10%  89.20%  75.30%  13.80%  *** 
19  IA helps resolve illegal turnout  83.50%  86.90%  78.00%  9.00%  *** 
20  IA helps resolve unscheduled gate opening/closing  85.80%  88.50%  81.50%  7.00%  *** 
21 
Household often participates in maintenance of main 
farm ditch  73.00%  75.30%  69.10%  6.30%  ** 
22 
Household often participates in maintenance of sub-
laterals 62.00%  64.50%  57.60%  6.90%  ** 
23  Household often participates in maintenance of laterals  62.40%  65.10%  57.60%  7.50%  *** 
   Perception of Change in the last five years (% yes)              
24  Improvement in cropping intensity  5.30%  4.80%  6.10%  -1.30%    
26  Improvement in IA services  33.10%  36.60%  27.20%  9.40%  *** 
27  Improvement in farmer participation in O&M  44.00%  47.00%  38.90%  8.00%  *** 
28  Improvement in water delivery timeliness  32.10%  34.60%  27.70%  6.80%  ** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Significance levels based on t-tests.  
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Table 3:  Propensity Score and Instrumental Variable Estimations of the Impact of IMT on 
Irrigation Association Performance 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Significance levels based on t-tests. 




    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 







   Maintenance                   
1 
Prepare maintenance 
plan every year  15.4%   23.6%   30.2%   -27.0%   47.8%  ** 
2 
Canal maintenance 
more than twice a 
season  or  when  needed  61.5% ***  80.9% ***  62.8% ***  63.7% ***  60.6%  *** 
   ISF Collection                   
4 
Collection Efficiency 
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Table 4:  IMT Effect on Rice Production  
   (1)  (2)  (2) 




1  Log of Material costs / Ha  0.072***  0.072**  0.071** 
   (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
2  Log of Labor costs / Ha  0.434***  0.440***  0.441*** 
   (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
3 District:2    0.039**  0.040** 
     (0.018)  (0.018) 
4 Age  of  Head    -0.001  -0.001 
     (0.000)  (0.000) 
5  Total number of household members    0.001  0.001 
     (0.003)  (0.003) 
6  Max family education HS Grad or 
above 
 -0.032**  -0.033** 
     (0.014)  (0.014) 
7 Non  Catholic    0.036**  0.037*** 
     (0.014)  (0.014) 
8  Agri extension office    -0.038  -0.037 
     (0.023)  (0.023) 
9  Days for water to reach farm    -0.003*  -0.003** 
     (0.001)  (0.001) 
10 Drainage  canal    0.044*  0.044** 
     (0.023)  (0.023) 
11  Number of head gate    -0.011***  -0.011*** 
     (0.003)  (0.003) 
12  Number of modified pipes    0.000  0.000 
     (0.003)  (0.003) 
13 Number  of  duckbill    0.002  0.003 
     (0.005)  (0.005) 
14 IMT      0.058***  0.053*** 
     (0.016)  (0.018) 
15 Constant  3.847***  3.754***  3.757*** 
   (0.53)  (0.650)  (0.646) 
 Observations  1020  993  993 
 R-squared  0.31  0.36   
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Significance levels based on t-tests.  
@ Table 5 presents the second regression used in the instrumental variable approach. 
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Table 5:  Probit regression of IMT on Independent Variables 
   Coefficents  (SE) 
1 District:2  -2.484*** 
   (0.875) 
2  Median edu of head is >= HS Grad  0.912 
   (0.814) 
3  % sample HH Catholic in IA  -5.249*** 
   (1.755) 
4  Avg Yrs HH member of Other User Groups  0.641*** 
   (0.171) 
5  Avg Land size (ha) per HH in IA  0.853** 
   (0.365) 
6  Land Gini by IA  2.185 
   (1.842) 
7  Farmers IA members  0.017*** 
   (0.005) 
8  Length of canal / lateral  -0.493 
   (0.450) 
9  Number of head gate  -0.566* 
   (0.332) 
10  Number of modified pipes  0.974*** 
   (0.251) 
11 Number  of  duckbill  0.378** 
   (0.159) 
12  IA with post office  0.395 
   (0.609) 
13  Ratio of IMT-IA in Municipality  12.696*** 
   (2.628) 
14 Constant  -9.368*** 
   (2.965) 
  ρ  0.065 
   (0.055) 
  Log σ  -1.700*** 
   (0.057) 
 Observations  993 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Significance levels based in t-tests. 
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Table 6: Frontier production function and technical efficiency from IMT 
   (1)  (2) 








1  Log of Material costs / Ha  0.0570**  0.0467** 
   (0.023)  (0.022) 
2  Log of Labor costs / Ha  0.395***  0.385*** 
   (0.038)  (0.037) 
3 Constant  4.536***  4.700*** 
   (0.47)  (0.45) 
4  ln σ
2
v  -4.307*** -4.251*** 
   (0.14)  (0.15) 
5  ln σ
2
u    
 Constant  -2.852***  -2.754*** 
   (0.16)  (0.50) 
6 District:2    -0.235 
     (0.21) 
7  Age of Head    0.00301 
     (0.0053) 
8  Total number of household members    0.0107 
     (0.039) 
9  Max family education HS Grad or above    0.409* 
     (0.22) 
10 Non  Catholic    -0.405** 
     (0.18) 
11  Agricultural  extension office    0.212 
     (0.26) 
12  Days for water to reach farm    0.0339** 
     (0.016) 
13 Drainage  canal    -0.401 
     (0.26) 
14  Number of head gates    0.0766 
     (0.052) 
15  Number of modified pipes    -0.00112 
     (0.022) 
16  Number of duckbills    0.0182 
     (0.041) 
17 IMT    -0.787*** 
     (0.18) 
 Observations  1020  993 
      
 ATT    2.2%*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Significance levels based in t-tests. 
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Table 7:  IMT Effect on Rice Production – Poor and Rich Differences 
   (1)  (2) 
Sl. N.  Independent Variables  Asset Rich  Asset Poor 
1  Log of Material costs / Ha  0.050  0.095** 
   (0.037) (0.047) 
2  Log of Labor costs / Ha  0.378***  0.551*** 
   (0.048) (0.085) 
3 District:2  0.044***  0.036 
   (0.016) (0.030) 
4 Age  of  Head  -0.000  -0.001 
   (0.000) (0.001) 
5  Total number of household members  0.001  -0.001 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
6  Max family education HS Grad or above  -0.025  -0.041* 
   (0.026) (0.024) 
7 Non  Catholic  0.034**  0.045 
   (0.014) (0.027) 
8  Agri extension office  -0.034  -0.049 
   (0.034) (0.033) 
9  Days for water to reach farm  -0.002  -0.003 
   (0.002) (0.003) 
10 Drainage  canal  0.030  0.059** 
   (0.028) (0.027) 
11  Number of head gate  -0.010**  -0.011** 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
12  Number of modified pipes  0.002  -0.003 
   (0.002) (0.004) 
13 Number  of  duckbill  -0.001  0.006 
   (0.005) (0.006) 
14 IMT  0.036**  0.089*** 
   (0.016) (0.026) 
15 Constant  4.548***  2.503** 
   (0.684) (1.130) 
 Observations  592  401 
 R-squared  0.32  0.42 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Significance levels based in t-tests. 
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Table 8: Frontier production function for asset rich and asset poor 
 (1)  (2) 
Independent Variables 
 
Asset Rich  Asset Poor  
Log of Material costs / Ha  0.0337  0.0607** 
 (0.034)  (0.025) 
Log of Labor costs / Ha  0.353***  0.441*** 
 (0.050)  (0.049) 
Constant 5.120***  4.024*** 
 (0.66)  (0.54) 
ln σ
2
v  -4.268*** -4.066*** 
 (0.18)  (0.38) 
ln σ
2
u    
Constant -2.829***  -3.369** 
 (0.67)  (1.52) 
District:2 -0.565**  0.236 
 (0.26)  (0.38) 
Age of Head  -0.00186  0.0112 
 (0.0074)  (0.012) 
Total number of household members  0.0318  0.00688 
 (0.052)  (0.072) 
Max family education HS Grad or above  0.280  0.574 
 (0.31)  (0.62) 
Non Catholic  -0.479**  -0.436 
 (0.23)  (0.38) 
Agricultural  extension office  0.454  -0.0377 
 (0.39)  (0.37) 
Days for water to reach farm  0.0263  0.0530* 
 (0.018)  (0.031) 
Drainage canal  -0.143  -0.478 
 (0.27)  (0.43) 
Number of head gates  0.116  0.00169 
 (0.079)  (0.089) 
Number of modified pipes  -0.0529*  0.0417 
 (0.031)  (0.046) 
Number of duckbills  0.0201  0.0225 
 (0.053)  (0.071) 
IMT -0.596***  -1.132** 
 (0.23)  (0.52) 
Observations  592    401 
    
ATT 1.7%***  3.4%*** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Significance levels based in t-tests. 
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Table 9:  Differences in perceptions about irrigation water delivery among asset poor in IMT and 
non-IMT areas 
 
  Questions Regarding Timeliness of Water 
Delivery and Conflict Resolution 
Percent of Asset Poor who said Yes 
   Total IMT  IA NON-IMT 
IA 
Difference 
1  Is the water distribution schedule followed?  71.1%  75.3%  63.8%  11.5%*** 
2  Does the IA help resolve illegal checking?  84.2%  88.7%  77.1%  11.7%*** 
3  Does the IA help resolve illegal pumping?  84.9%  92.2%  73.4%  18.7%*** 
4  Does the IA help resolve illegal turnout?  84.4%  89.7%  76.3%  13.3%*** 
5  Does the IA help resolve unscheduled gate 
opening/closing? 
87.1% 90.9%  81.9%  9.0%** 
6  Is your farm located downstream?  29.4%  32.4%  24.2%  8.3%** 
7  Do you get water when needed during the dry 
season? 
65.4% 70.9%  55.7%  15.2%*** 
8  Do you get water when needed during the wet 
season? 
95.6% 96.1%  94.6%  1.5% 
9  Did you pay your irrigation service fees twice 
in the last two seasons? 
90.7% 92.7%  87.2%  5.4%** 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Significance levels based in t-tests. 
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 Table 1A:   Instrument Variable coefficients of Impact Evaluation 














District:2 0.157  -2.490*** 0.166  -2.490*** -0.0454  -2.490** 
  (0.12)  (0.83) (0.13) (0.90) (0.076)  (0.98) 
Median edu of 
head is >= HS 
Grad 
0.0170 0.903  0.0670  0.903  -0.220  0.903 
  (0.12)  (0.80) (0.12) (0.82) (0.16) (1.22) 
Percent Catholic  0.0256  -5.301*** 0.441*  -5.301*** 0.123  -5.301 
  (0.28)  (1.87) (0.25) (1.70) (0.39) (3.23) 
Avg Yrs HH 
member of Other 
User 
0.00370 0.643*** -0.0643** 0.643*** -0.0172 0.643** 
  (0.033)  (0.17) (0.031)  (0.17) (0.022)  (0.32) 
Avg Land size 
(ha) per HH in IA 
-0.0912* 0.851**  -0.0553 0.851**  0.0460 0.851***
  (0.050)  (0.37) (0.053)  (0.39) (0.034)  (0.31) 
Land Gini by IA  -0.400  2.135  -0.764*  2.135  -0.569  2.135 
  (0.53)  (2.08) (0.43) (1.71) (0.59) (2.73) 
Farmers IA 
members 
0.0000746 0.0168*** -0.00149*** 0.0168*** -0.000389 0.0168***
 (0.00072) (0.0057)  (0.00056)  (0.0055) (0.00064)  (0.0053) 
Length of canal / 
lateral 
0.120** -0.472 -0.0435  -0.472  0.0881*** -0.472 
  (0.054)  (0.47) (0.051)  (0.46) (0.030)  (0.50) 
Number of head 
gate 
0.0428  -0.565 -0.0334  -0.565 -0.0152  -0.565 
  (0.040)  (0.40) (0.044)  (0.38) (0.024)  (0.38) 
Number of 
modified pipes 
0.00776 0.976*** -0.00276 0.976*** 0.0120  0.976***
  (0.017)  (0.26) (0.014)  (0.23) (0.0087)  (0.20) 
Number of 
duckbill 
0.0264  0.385** 0.0333  0.385** 0.00246 0.385** 
  (0.030)  (0.17) (0.026)  (0.16) (0.022)  (0.16) 
IA with post 
office 
-0.0786  0.420 -0.0954 0.420 -0.0749 0.420 
  (0.13)  (0.60) (0.10) (0.62) (0.12) (1.12) 
IA with IMT 
Contract 
0.478**  0.606***  0.104   
  (0.20)   (0.15)   (0.35)   
Ratio of IMT-IA 
in Municipality 
  12.77***   12.77***   12.77 
    (2.73)   (2.55)   (0) 
Constant -0.0315  -9.454*** 0.891*** -9.454*** 0.681***  -9.454***
  (0.33)  (3.04) (0.26) (3.12) (0.24) (2.33) 
Observations  67  67 67 67 66 66 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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